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RECENT CASES
COMMERCE CLAUSE-TENTH AMENDMENT-1974 AMEND-
MENTS TO FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT INVALIDATED. National
League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
In National League of Cities v. Usery' the United States Supreme
Court resurrected the tenth amendment 2 as a viable limitation upon federal
commerce power regulation of state activities. 3 Expressly reversing its
landmark Maryland v. Wirtz4 decision, a divided Court5 invalidated the
1974 amendments6 to the Fair Labor Standards Act7 as an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional authority extending beyond the permissible
scope of the commerce clause.8 In so doing, the Court halted its long-
standing practice of upholding commerce power regulations without
regard to their effects upon state sovereignty.
9
As originally adopted in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act'"
specifically excluded the states and their political subdivisions from its
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions by narrowly defining
"employer." " I In 1966, the Act was amended, 12 removing a portion of the
broad state exemption' 3 and including certain employees of state-operated
hospitals, institutions and schools within its coverage. 4 The 1974 amend-
1. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
2. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. This amendment has traditionally been ineffective in inhibiting the expansion of
federal power. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
3. 96 S. Ct. at 2469.
4. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act as applied to certain employees of state-operated hospitals, institutions and schools).
Wirtz was the first Warren Court decision to be overruled by the Burger Court.
5. The decision was 5 to 4 with Justice Blackmun filing a concurring opinion.
6. Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 58 (April 8, 1974).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
8. 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
9. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text infra.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1940). " 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the
United States or any State or political subdivision of a State. Id.
12. Pub. L. 89-601, 80 Stat. 831 (Sept. 23, 1966).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970). " 'Employer'. . . shall not include the United States or
any State or political subdivision of a State (except with respect to employees of a State, or a
political subdivision thereof, employed . . . in a hospital, institution, or school .... )" Id.
14. This amendment precipitated the decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968). See note 4 supra, notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra.
ments15 included "a public agency"' 16 within the definition of "em-
ployer," 17 thereby entirely removing the exemption previously afforded
the states and their political subdivisions and bringing virtually all public
employees' 8 within the federal wage and hour provisions of the Act.
The National League of Cities, the National Governors Conference,
nineteen individual states, and five county and municipal governments
challenged the 1974 amendments, seeking both declaratory and injunctive
relief. 19 After hearing the arguments on the merits,2" the three-judge
district court dismissed the action, stating that although it was "troubled"
by the "difficult and substantial question''21 presented, its actions were
"controlled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Maryland v.
Wirtz. "22 Acting as an individual Circuit Judge for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, Chief Justice Burger granted a temporary stay of the amend-
ments pending presentation to the full Court.23 The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.
24
Until the beginning of this century, the states routinely acquiesced to
the superiority of the federal government in those rare instances in which
Congress exercised its commerce power affirmatively to regulate state
activities .25 The tremendous economic and industrial growth of the United
States and the corresponding increase in federal commerce power regula-
tions resulted in greater infringement upon the sovereignty of the states. 26
Eventually, the states reacted by challenging the federal regulations as
violative of the tenth amendment.27
The Supreme Court initially responded to the states' challenges by
15. Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 58 (April 8, 1974).
16. " 'Public agency' means the Government of the United States; the government of a
State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States .... a State, or a
political subdivision of a State .. " Id. at 64.
17. " 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency. ... Id.
18. The minimum wage and maximum hour provisions do not apply to "any employee
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (including any
employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in
elementary or secondary schools) .. " 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1970).
19. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974)(three-judge
court). The action, which was argued on December 30 and decided on December 31, 1974, was
an attempt to block those portions of the 1974 amendments and the regulations adopted
pursuant thereto that were to become effective on January 1, 1975. Id. at 826-27.
20. The plaintiffs argued that by putting a fiscal burden upon state and local govern-
ments by forcing them either to increase revenues or to curtail governmental services, the
amendments "will intrude upon the state's performance of essential governmental functions
far more than those reviewed in Wirtz . 406 F. Supp. at 827-28.
21. Id. at 827.
22. Id. See note 4 supra, notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra.
23. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 419 U.S. 1321 (1974). The stay was granted
on December 31, 1974, because of "the pervasive impact of the judgment of the District Court
on every state and municipal government. . . ,the novelty of the legal questions presented,
the expressed concern of the District Court. . . , the brevity of time available .... and the
extent and nature of the injury to the applicants .... ." Id. at 1322.
24. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 420 U.S. 906, hearing scheduled sub nom.
National League of Cities v. Dunlop, 421 U.S. 986 (1975).
25. See generallySholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI.
L. REV. 556 (1936).
26. See generally E. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES' RIGHTS (1936).
27. See, e.g., cases cited, notes 28-51 and accompanying text infra.
defining the federal commerce power in exclusive and unconditional
terms, irrespective of any encroachment upon the sovereignty of the states.
In Sanitary District v. United States,28 a unanimous Court upheld an order
enjoining the Sanitary District of Chicago from diverting large quantities of
water from Lake Michigan 29 despite the fact that the water was being
removed in the performance of an essential governmental function that was
mandated by state law.3" Dismissing petitioner's state sovereignty argu-
ments, Justice Holmes stated:
This is not a controversy between equals. The United States
is asserting its sovereign power to regulate commerce and to
control the navigable waters within its jurisdiction.
• . .There is no question that this power is superior to that
of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their
inhabitants.
31
The Sanitary District holding was extended in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions that upheld federal commerce power regulations, without regard
to whether the activity was being conducted by the state in its governmental
or proprietary capacity, 32 as long as the activity was a valid subject of
federal regulation when conducted by a private entity33 or was shown to
"affect commerce." 34
More recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that in proper
circumstances it may depart from the well-established pattern of unques-
tioningly upholding congressional commerce power regulation of state
activities. In Maryland v. Wirtz35 a divided Court36 upheld the 1966
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 37 stating that it refused to
"carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in
their effect on commerce from private businesses, simply because those
28. 266 U.S. 405 (1925). See also Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S.
1177 (1910).
29. The federal government asserted that failure to adhere to the imposed withdrawal
limits would lower the water level in the lake and its harbors, obstructing navigation and
hindering commerce. 266 U.S. at 243.
30. The Sanitary District argued that the increased volume of water was necessary to
ensure the adequate removal of Chicago's sewage as required by the Illinois Act of May 29,
1889. Id. at 424.
31. Id. at 425-26 (emphasis added). But see Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (a
similar fact situation in which the United States' petition to intervene was denied on the basis
of tenth amendment restrictions).
32. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183 (1936) (state-owned Belt Railroad
subject to Federal Safety Appliance Act); Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48,56
(1933) (state instrumentality required to pay import duties-imposed under the commerce
power-upon products utilized in the performance of governmental functions). See also
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184(1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); NLRB
v. Local 254, Bldg. Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, 376 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1967).
33. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); United States v. California, 297 U.S.
175 (1936).
34. See United States v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9(1966), rev'gpercuriam, 354 F.2d 549(6thCir.
1965). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942).
35. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
36. This was the first ime that the Supreme Court decided this issue by a less than
unanimous decision. Compare United States v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9 (1966); United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933);
Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
37. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
enterprises happen to be run by the States . ... "38 Although the decision
had the effect of greatly expanding the federal commerce power, the Wirtz
court was careful to point out that it had "ample power to prevent. .. 'the
utter destruction of the state as a sovereign political entity.' "39
The implied recognition of state sovereignty as an eventual limitation
of the federal commerce power in Wirtz was unequivocally expressed in
Fry v. United States.40 Like Wirtz, Fry upheld the challenged federal
regulation despite its infringement upon state sovereignty. 4 In Fry,
however, the Court clearly stated that Congress could not exercise its
commerce power in a manner that "impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system"4 2 and that future federal
legislation or regulations that constitute a "drastic invasion of state
sovereignty" would be invalidated.
4 3
In National League of Cities the Supreme Court applied the criteria
enunciated in Fry v. United States' in determining that the 1974 amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act would impair the states' "ability to
function effectively within a federal system." ,45 Responding to petitioner's
argument46 that the tenth amendment is an affirmative constitutional
limitation upon the congressional exercise of the commerce power to
regulate the States as employers, the Court stated,
This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the
power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when
exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate
commerce ....
* * .We have repeatedly recognized that there are attri-
butes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
38. 392 U.S. at 198-99. See also Brennan v. Indiana, 517 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975);
Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1974); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1970).
But see Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welf., 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (dismissing a
suit against the state by employees due overtime pay under the Act).
39. 392 U.S. at 196. In his dissenting opinion Justice Douglas attempted to distinguish
Wirtz from all other cases that had upheld federal regulation of state activities, stating that this
was the first time the regulation would have the effect of overwhelming a state's fiscal policy.
He strongly advocated the separation of governmental from proprietary functions for the
purpose of delineating the extent of the federal commerce power over the activities of the
states. Id. at 203-05.
40. 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (upholding an injunction prohibiting Ohio from granting salary
increases to state employees in excess of amounts authorized by the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970).
41. 421 U.S. at 548 (holding that the pay raise restrictions were "even less intrusive"
than the regulations challenged in Wirtz in that they were only temporary and did not require
any additional expenditures by the State). See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
42. Id. at 547 n.7.
43. Id. The Court did not specify how "drastic" an invasion of state sovereignty must
be in order to invoke Supreme Court action.
44. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
45. 96 S. Ct. at 2474. This conclusion was based upon three effects of the amendments:
(1) to result in substantial increases in cost to the states without any corresponding increase in
services; (2) to force the states to curtail or discontinue essential services and activities; and
(3) to displace existing state policies with respect to wage and work structures. These effects
combined to be so "highly.disruptive of accepted employment practices [as] ... impermiss-
ibly [to] interfere with the integral governmental functions [of the States and their political
subdivisions]." Id. at 2471-73.
46. Id. at 2469. Petitioners likened the tenth amendment limitation on the commerce
power to limitations previously established by the jury trial provision of the sixth amendment,
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising
the authority in that manner.
47
Addressing respondent's argument that the amendments could not, consis-
tently with the decisions in Maryland v. Wirtz48 and Fry v. United States,49
be invalidated, the Court distinguished Fry5° and overruled Wirtz.5
The decision in National League of Cities is highly significant in that
it confirms, at least for the present, that the federal commerce power is
limited by state sovereignty considerations. Unfortunately, one cannot
readily ascertain precisely where the limit of that power lies. Those federal
regulations that entail a "drastic invasion of state sovereignty" as in
National League of Cities and Maryland v. Wirtz52 are clearly beyond the
pale of permissible federal intervention. On the other hand, federal
regulations that represent only a "temporary intrusion" upon state
sovereignty, as in Fry v. United States,53 will be tolerated. The difficulty
lies in making a determination of the validity of federal regulations that fall
between these extremes. The concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun in
National League of Cities further clouds the issue by concluding that the
decision "does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental
protection where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where
state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be
essential. -5
The Supreme Court's unusually heavy reliance upon the particular
fact situation presented in National League of Cities,55 coupled with the
caveat of the concurring opinion,56 requires that subsequent cases with
similar issues be decided on an ad hoc basis. Considering the constantly
expanding scope of the federal regulatory process and the ever-increasing
case load of the courts, this result is clearly less than desirable.
The Supreme Court has recently agreed to review three circuit court
decisions5 7 that had invalidated federal commerce clause regulation of state
47. 96 S. Ct. at 2469-71.
48. 392 U.S. 183 (1968); see notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
49. 421 U.S. 542 (1975); see notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
50. The Court stated that, "the degree of intrusion upon the protected area of state
sovereignty was in that case . . . 'an emergency measure to counter severe inflation that
threatened the national economy.' "96 S. Ct. at 2474 (citation omitted). The Court refused to
hold that the limits imposed upon congressional exercise of the commerce power were "so
inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency." Id.
at 2475.
51. Id. at 2476. The Court reaffirmed that "the States as States stand on a quite
different footing than an individual or a corporation" with respect to the commerce power. Id.
at 2475.
52. 392 U.S. 183 (1968); see notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
53. 421 U.S. 542 (1975); see notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
54. 96 S. Ct. at 2476 (concurring opinion). The fact that this concurring opinion was the
deciding factor in a five-to-four outcome may somewhat erode the significance of the
decision.
55. Id. at 2465 (1976); see notes 44-51 and accompanying text supra.
56. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
57. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
2224 (1976); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224
(1976); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976).
activities arising from the Clean Air Act. 58 Not only are the issues of these
cases virtually identical to those of NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, but
they also deal with environmental protection-an area in which "the
federal interest is demonstrably greater" 59 than in National League of
Cities. Perhaps the Court will take advantage of this opportunity to solidify
its position and more explicitly define the state sovereignty limitation on
the federal commerce power.
CRIMINAL LAW-INCOME TAX INVESTIGATIONS-MIRANDA WARNING
NOT REQUIRED PRIOR TO NON-CUSTODIAL INTERVIEW WITH IRS
AGENTS. Beckwith v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1612 (1976).
In Beckwith v. United States' the Supreme Court held that incriminat-
ing evidence obtained from a taxpayer by Internal Revenue Service special
agents2 during a noncustodial interrogation was admissible against him in a
subsequent criminal prosecution despite the fact that he had not been
advised of his fifth3 and sixth4 amendment rights in accordance with
Miranda v. Arizona.5 The opinion thus specifically confines the applica-
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(1970). All three of these cases involve the question of whether the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency can require the states to adopt and
enforce federal transportation control regulations promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-5(c).
59. See note 54 and accompanying text supra. These cases will provide an opportunity
for Justice Blackmun to clarify his position.
[Casenote by Leslie L. Kasten, Jr.]
I. 96 S. Ct. 1612 (1976).
2. Special agents are members of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and become involved in cases only when the possibility of a criminal violation
exists. See United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847,853-54 (N.D.III. 1967). When an IRS
investigation is civil in nature, the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), need not be given, even though the investigation produces evidence that is later used in
a criminal prosecution. See notes 3, 29 infra.
3. "No person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Petitioner Beckwith was read the following:
As a special agent, one of my functions is to investigate the possibility of
criminal violations of Internal Revenue laws, and related offenses.
Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, I cannot
compel you to answer any questions or to submit any information if such answers
or information might tend to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that
anything you say and any information which you submit may be used against you in
any criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further that you
may, if you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney before responding.
96 S. Ct. at 1614. These warnings appear deficient under Miranda in at least two respects.
First, they do not specifically advise of the right to remain silent. Moreover, the IRS warnings
imply that a person may be compelled to answer questions when the answer would not be
incriminating. Miranda, however, specifically states that an individual need not answer any
question. 384 U.S. at 467-68. Second, the warnings do not alert an individual to his right to
have counsel appointed if he is financially unable to retain a lawyer. Id. at 472.
The majority opinion in Beckwith does not deal with the question whether the IRS
warnings are sufficient under Miranda. Nevertheless, in a concurring opinion, Justice
Marshall concluded that the warnings were satisfactory under the circumstances of the case.
96 S. Ct. at 1617.
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tion of Miranda to situations in which the subject of interrogation is
actually in custody or otherwise significantly deprived of freedom of
action.6 The decision rejects the position taken by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals that a person confronted with governmental authority
during a criminal investigation is psychologically unable to make a
voluntary waiver of rights absent Miranda warnings.7 In so holding, the
Court resolved the conflict between the Seventh Circuit and other courts
that have ruled on the issue.' Finally, the court held that when interrogation
is non-custodial, the courts shall determine, by careful evaluation of the
facts surrounding each case, whether proper safeguards have been em-
ployed to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.
9
In Beckwith, two IRS special agents met with the petitioner in a
private home to discuss possible federal income tax liability. The agents
identified themselves as members of the Intelligence Division' ° and
advised the petitioner that one of their functions was to investigate potential
criminal tax fraud. One agent read a set of warnings" 1 to the petitioner, as
required by the IRS.' 2 Beckwith acknowledged that he understood his
rights. The interview, which lasted three hours, was described by the IRS
agents as "friendly" and "relaxed.'" 3 At the conclusion of the interview,
the agents requested access to certain documents located at the petitioner's
place of business. The agents and the petitioner then travelled there
separately. Before he handed over the documents, the petitioner was
advised that he was not required to do so. At trial, the statements made by
the petitioner at the interview and the documents handed over afterwards
were the principal evidence of the prosecution.
The petitioner moved for suppression of all evidence obtained during
the interview and from the documents. His motion was based upon the
theory that full Miranda warnings were required as soon as the government
6. Of the eight Justices who took part in the Beckwith decision, only three were
members of the Court when it decided Miranda. In Miranda, the Court had focused sharply
on custody. "The constitutional issue we decide . . . is the admissibility of statements
obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action .... " 384 U.S. 445. A person is "in custody" when he is "taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
7. United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dickerson,
413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969). Cf. United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1971)
(supporting Dickerson in dictum).
8. See United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stribling,
437 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1970); United
States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Brevik, 422 F.2d 449 (8th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Browney, 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970); Hensley v. United States,
406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1968);
Spinney v. United States, 385 F.2d 908 (Ist Cir. 1967).
9. 96 S. Ct. at 1617.
10. See note 2 supra.
II. See note 5 supra.
12. IRS News Release No. IR-949 (Nov. 26, 1968), [1968] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 6946; IRS News Release No. 897 (Oct. 3, 1967), [19671 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 6835. This procedure is still followed by the IRS.
13. Testimony at trial indicated that the petitioner was free to move about and that other
persons were in the house during the interview. The petitioner testified that he was not
pressed to answer any question.
focuses criminal investigation upon an individual. 4 The petitioner argued
that the combined criminal and civil investigative functions of the IRS
confuse most taxpayers and, therefore, make voluntary waiver of constitu-
tional rights impossible without full Miranda warnings. Under these
circumstances, confrontation by a criminal investigation was urged as the
legal equivalent of custody. 15 The district court denied petitioner's motion
and he was convicted of attempting to evade federal income taxes. 16 The
circuit court of appeals affirmed the conviction.'
7
Miranda requires that a criminal suspect be advised of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel prior to a custodial interrogation by
law enforcement officers; it defines "custodial interrogation" as question-
ing that occurs after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his
freedom in some significant way. 18 Miranda, however, was a response to a
particular factual setting. '9 The Court found that incommunicado interro-
gation in police-dominated surroundings could effectively overbear an
individual's ability freely to exercise his constitutional rights.20 The
interrogator could, under such circumstances, coerce an individual into
making incriminating statements without resorting to physical abuse. It
was held, therefore, that this type of mental compulsion was prohibited by
the fifth amendment. 2' Because this right is "fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule," the Court declined to take a case-by-case approach to
14. The "focus of investigation" theory is derived from a statement of Justice Goldberg
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
[When] the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect, . . . the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, . . . and the
police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain
silent . . . no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used
against him at a criminal trial.
The Escobedo decision initially caused a great deal of confusion because it failed to
define the procedure police had to follow in order to comply with it. Miranda, however,
provided that definition. Thus, references to the rationale of Escobedoare meaningless unless
coupled with the explanation of that rationale found in Miranda. 384 U.S. at 441-42.
15. 96 S. Ct. at 1615.
16. United States v. Beckwith, No. 73-480 (D.D.C. March 21, 1974).
17. United States v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
18. 384 U.S. at 444.
19. Miranda and three other cases decided at the same time shared the same essential
facts: "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police dominated atmosphere,
resulting in self incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights." Id. at
445.
20. The Court was particularly moved by the psychological techniques employed by
police in obtaining confessions. Descriptions of these techniques were gleaned from various
police manuals used by law enforcement agencies throughout the country. These manuals
stressed privacy as the "principle psychological factor contributing to a successful interroga-
tion." Under optimum conditions, the subject of interrogation would be isolated from friends
and counsel and confined in unfamiliar surroundings. Id. at 448-55.
Because of the danger of having valuable evidence found inadmissible, modern police
bulletins explain Miranda in detail and even go so far as to caution police to "avoid any
language which can later be used by defense attorneys to charge that the officer 'threatened,
tricked or cajoled' the defendant into waiving his rights." J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 509 (1972), quoting Chicago Police
Dept., Law Training Bulletin Series: Interrogation Procedures(Sept. 1966). Seetext at note 47
infra.
21. "The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate
himself." 384 U.S. at 457-58.
the issue of voluntariness 22 and ruled that all statements made during
custodial interrogations were inadmissible unless proper warnings were
given.
23
The applicability of these principles to criminal investigations by the
IRS has been much disputed24 because investigation of Internal Revenue
Code violations does not fit readily into the Miranda formula25 for three
reasons. First, an individual under investigation for such violations is
rarely taken into custody for interrogation. Second, the individual often
becomes the focal point of the investigation before it is determined whether
a crime has actually been committed. Third, because IRS investigators
handle both criminal 26 and civil 27 cases, a taxpayer may become confused
as to the nature of his liability. 28 The desire to minimize the possibility of
civil liability often promotes a taxpayer to cooperate with IRS agents to the
extent that he offers incriminating statements and thereby waives his fifth
amendment rights .29
The third point was stressed by the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Dickerson,3" the case upon which the petitioner in Beckwith relied. In
Dickerson, during a routine audit of a third party's returns, a revenue agent
discovered a payment to the petitioner for which he had filed no return. The
case was then assigned to a special agent for criminal investigation. 3 Over
a four-month period, the agent held five interviews with the petitioner,
during which the petitioner answered questions and furnished documents at
the agent's request. At no time was he given Miranda warnings, nor was he
22. Id. at 468.
23. Id. at 444.
24. See, e.g., Comment, Exclusions of Confessions Obtained Without Miranda Warn-
ings in Civil Tax Fraud Proceedings, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1288 (1973); Note, Constitutional
Rights of a Taxpayer in a Criminal Tax Investigation, 16 J. PuB. L. 403 (1967); Note, The
Effect of Miranda on Federal Income Tax Investigations, 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 729 (1971);
Note, Miranda Warnings and the Tax Fraud Investigation, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 596(1970); Note,
Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Tax Fraud Investigation, 42 TUL. L. REV. 862
(1968).
25. The same problems often apply to other "white collar" crimes such as bribery,
unauthorized practice of law, impersonation of a federal officer, criminal antitrust violations
and violations of § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. Comment, Exclusion of Confessions
Obtained Without Miranda Warnings in Civil Tax Fraud Proceedings, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1288 n.6 (1973).
26. "Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law be
guilty of a felony .... ." I.R.C. § 7201.
27. "Fraud-If any part of any underpayment of tax required to be shown is due to
fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 50 percent oi the underpayment." Id.
§ 6653(b).
28. In the majority of cases, information triggering a criminal investigation is disco-
vered during a routine civil audit. Barnett, Procedures in Tax Fraud In vestigations, 47 TAXES
807, 808-09 (1969).
29. Miranda warnings are of limited effectiveness in tax fraud cases because the
government may impose a heavy civil penalty in the event that criminal prosecution fails. See
note 27 supra. The fifth amendment, however, limits the privilege against self-incrimination
to criminal cases. See note 3 supra. But see Romanelli v. Commissioner, 466 F.2d 872 (7th Cir.
1972) (extending Miranda to civil tax suit defendants).
30. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
31. IRS procedure requires that when a revenue agent who is conducting a civil audit of
a taxpayers return discovers the possibility of a criminal violation, he must suspend his
investigation and transfer the case to the Intelligence Division for criminal prosecution. See
United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847, 853-54 (N.D. Il1. 1967).
informed that the investigation was criminal in nature. The District Court
suppressed all evidence obtained from the five interviews. 32 In affirming
the lower court's decision, the court of appeals construed the basis of
Miranda to be protection of an individual's right to exercise intelligently
his fifth amendment privilege. 33 Acknowledging the limits of the factual
situation presented in Miranda, the court nevertheless ruled that this was
not the only situation in which the procedural safeguards of Miranda
should be applied: "One confronted with governmental authority in an
adversary situation should be accorded the opportunity to make an intelli-
gent decision as to . . the relinquishment of . . .constitutional rights
... ,"34 The Dickerson court thus rejected the contention that a noncus-
todial interrogation lacks the element of psychological compulsion and,
therefore, does not violate the fifth amendment. Instead, the court stated
that even absent custody a taxpayer, unaware that a criminal investigation
has begun, may believe that he is compelled to provide information.
35
Other circuits that have ruled on the issue, however, reject Dicker-
son's subjective interpretation of Miranda.36 Typical of these cases is the
Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Prudden.37 In Prudden, the
court found the underlying basis of Miranda to be compulsion.38 Thus,
under circumstances substantially similar to those in Dickerson, it was
ruled that a taxpayer under criminal investigation by the IRS is not entitled
to Miranda warnings unless questioned while in custody. 39 These warn-
ings were viewed as a safeguard, an assurance that the individual was
aware of his rights when confronted with the coercion inherent in custodial
interrogation. When the individual is not deprived of his freedom, the
warnings are not essential to assure that a waiver of rights is voluntary.
40
Prudden specifically pointed out the concern voiced in Miranda over the
effects of psychological techniques employed by police to elicit confes-
sions.4 1 According to Miranda, the key to the success of those techniques
32. United States v. Dickerson, 291 F. Supp. 633 (N.D. I11. 1968).
33. 413 F.2d at 1114.
34. Id. The Seventh Circuit later reaffirmed and broadened its Dickerson position by
holding incriminating statements inadmissible even though IRS Miranda-like warnings had
been given. United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
35. "Incriminating statements elicited in reliance upon the taxpayer's misapprehension
as to the nature of the inquiry, his obligation to respond and the possible consequences of
doing so must be regarded as equally violative of constitutional protections as a custodial
confession extracted without proper warnings." 413 F.2d at 1116. Under the Dickerson rule,
therefore, Miranda warnings would be required as soon as the investigation is transferred to
the Intelligence Division for possible criminal action. At that point, the adversary process
"focuses" on the defendant; that is, "the investigatory machinery of the government is
directed toward the ultimate conviction of a particular individual." Id. at 1115. The Supreme
Court in Beckwith was unmoved by this argument, stating that Miranda specifically defined
"focus" in terms of custody. 96 S. Ct. at 1615.
36. See cases cited note 8 supra.
37. 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. Id. at 1026.
39. "Custody" is defined in note 6 supra. For a detailed discussion of the limits of the
term custody as defined by Miranda see Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda:
What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation, 25 S.C.L. REV. 699 (1974).
40. 424 F.2d 1021, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970).
41. Id. at 1026-27.
is that they be employed in isolated, unfamiliar and police-dominated
surroundings.42 Therefore, an interview with IRS agents at a taxpayer's
home or place of business, when the taxpayer is not pressed for answers
and is free to leave at all times, is not of the same compulsive nature as the
interrogations Miranda attempted to cure. The court reasoned further that
if Miranda warnings were required in noncompulsive situations such as
these, they would be required in all confrontations between government
and individuals who are potential objects of future criminal prosecution.43
This result would be clearly beyond the limits of Miranda.'
In support of its objective interpretation of Miranda, the Prudden
court cited United States v. Mathis.4 5 In Mathis, the Supreme Court held
that statements made to IRS special agents by a taxpayer in custody for an
unrelated state offense were inadmissible because the taxpayer had not
been given Miranda warnings. Unmoved by the fact that the taxpayer was
being held for a separate offense,4 6 the Court found custody to be the
controlling factor. It logically follows, therefore, that in a noncustodial
situation, Miranda would not be applicable.
Beckwith adopts this objective interpretation of Miranda: "The
narrow issue before the Court in Miranda was presented very precisely in
the opening paragraph of that opinion-'the admissibility of statements
obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodialpolice interroga-
tion.' ," The decision views Miranda warnings as a prophylactic, a
protective measure used to avoid the taint of compulsion inherent in
custodial interrogations.48 No weight was given to the petitioner's conten-
tion that the "focus of investigation" triggers the need for Miranda
warnings. 49 "It was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and
not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the
questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the Miranda
requirements .... "50 While recognizing that under certain circum-
stances law enforcement officers might elicit involuntary, incriminating
42. From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the set-
ting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence,
it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to
deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines
his will to resist.
384 U.S. at 455.
43. "Under such a rule a policeman upon stopping a motorist could not ask to see his
license without warning him and advising him in full." United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d
1021, 1028 (5th Cir. 1970). Cf. United States v. Marlow, 423 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970) (routine
request to see driver's license produced evidence leading directly to conviction for a federal
offense).
44. If Miranda had been extended to all confrontations with governmental authority,
the effect could have been far more devastating than the contrary limitation that was imposed.
Had Miranda warnings become routine in all such encounters, they would become mere
formalities, shorn of the significance that makes them effective as a constitutional warning.
45. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
46. Id. at 4-5.
47. 96 S. Ct. at 1615.
48. Id. at 1616.
49. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
50. Beckwith v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (1976), quoting United States v.
Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1969).
statements made when the declarant is not in custody,"' the Court neverthe-
less chose not to extend Miranda to cover these circumstances. Rather,
when a noncustodial confession is challenged, voluntariness is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.52 Proof that some warnings were given
would be evidence "only on the issue of whether the questioning was in
fact coercive." 
53
The consequences of Beckwith will sweep beyond the specific cir-
cumstances of that case. The decision is strong authority limiting Miranda
to purely custodial interrogations. 54 Because of this restriction, many will
interpret the decision as another in the recent line of cases55 thought to have
eroded the overall breadth of Miranda. In actuality, the decision does
nothing to undermine the force of Miranda.5 6 To the contrary, it merely
reaffirms the bounds originally set in Miranda: that the Miranda rule is
applicable only to situations in which the defendant is in custody or
otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom of action. 5 Beckwith
stands, therefore, as a strict but proper interpretation of the principles of
Miranda.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT REJECTION
OF "UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS" STANDARD OF SECTION 402A,
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, HELD DEFICIENT AS BINDING PRECEDENT.
Bair v. American Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1976).
In 1975 Chief Justice Jones of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
seeking to "clarify the concepts of strict liability under Pennsylvania
law,"' handed down the decision in Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
•51. Id. at 1617. One instance when this might occur is when a juvenile is questioned by a
police officer, even though he is not considered a suspect. Confronted with such authority he
may feel compelled to answer: and thereby incriminate himself without being cognizant of his
constitutional rights.
Police manuals now list other noncustodial situations in which a person may feel
compelled to answer questions. These include approaching a person in unfamiliar surround-
ings, approaching a person who is alone, and questioning late at night or very early in the
morning. The manuals urge particular caution be exercised in these situations. See J. MILES,
LAW OFFICERS POCKET MANUAL § 8:4 (1973).
52. 96 S. Ct. at 1617.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (refusing to extend the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to Miranda and allowing the prosecution to use an illegally obtained
confession directly in securing other evidence); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
(ruling that a confession obtained in violation of Miranda could be used for impeachment
purposes).
56. See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
57, See text at note 47 supra.
[Casenote by James R. Ronca]
1. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 91, 337 A.2d 893, 897 (1975).
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1. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 91, 337 A.2d 893, 897 (1975).
Corp.2 He concluded that the "unreasonably dangerous" 3 standard for
defective products under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts4 injected negligence concepts into 402A actions and should be
purged from the Pennsylvania law of strict liability.
5
Any clarification achieved by the Chief Justice was immediately
dissipated by the holding of the other justices. Chief Justice Jones'
reasoning in criticizing the "unreasonably dangerous" standard was
acknowledged by only one other member of the court. 6 Two other justices
filed separate concurring opinions that did not discuss the "unreasonably
dangerous" standard, 7 while three justices 8 concurred in the result.
In 1976 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Bair v.
American Motors Corp. ,9 refused to reverse a decision in which the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania' ° had applied
the "unreasonably dangerous" standard in a products liability case. The
court held that the Jones opinion had not changed the Pennsylvania law of
strict liability since an opinion endorsed by only two members of the
supreme court did not carry the weight of law in Pennsylvania. The court
2. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975); see 80 DiCK. L. REV. 633 (1976).
3. See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
4. Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (i) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT 402A].
5. Chief Justice Jones concluded that
the 'reasonable man' standard in any form has no place in a strict liability case. The
salutary purpose of the 'unreasonably dangerous' qualification is to preclude the
seller's liability where it cannot be said that the product is defective; this purpose
can be met by requiring proof of a defect.
462 Pa. at 96, 337 A.2d at 900.
6. Justice Nix added his signature to the opinion of Chief Justice Jones. In addition to
rejecting the "unreasonably dangerous" standard, the Chief Justice and Justice Nix also held
that the trial court had improperly included foreseeability as an element of proximate cause
and that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury on abnormal use and discussing the
admissibility of evidence to show abnormal use. They suggested that contributory negligence
was not a defense to 402A actions, and that a product may be held defective if a seller fails to
provide proper warnings or instructions for its use. 462 Pa. at 92-104, 337 A.2d at 897-903.
7. Justice Roberts concurred in a separate opinion in which he agreed with Chief
Justice Jones and Justice Nix that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury on
abnormal use. 462 Pa. at 104, 337 A.2d at 903-04. Justice Pomeroy concurred in a separate
opinion, in which he agreed with Chief Justice Jones and Justice Nix that a seller's failure to
warn or give proper instructions could render a product defective. 462 Pa. at 104-05, 337 A.2d
at 904. See note 6 supra.
8. 462 Pa. at 104, 337 A.2d at 903 (JJ. Eagen, O'Brien & Manderino).
9. 535 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
10. Bair v. American Motors Corp., Civil No. 75-188 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1976).
11. 535 F.2d at 250.
also referred to Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co. ,12 in which Judge Huyett
had debated the utility of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard. In that
case, the judge concluded that the standard was of value in implementing
the policy goals of strict liability, 13 and that it had not been purged from
402A actions in Pennsylvania. I4 This casenote assesses the impact of Bair
upon the precedential value of Berkebile.
Jurisdiction for the Bair case was based upon diversity of citizenship
and an adequate amount in controversy. ' 5 The basic premise in diversity
cases is that "a federal court is in effect only another court of the state in
which it sits and applies the same law that would be applied if the action had
been brought in state courts." 16 When confronted with a case in which the
state's highest court has not conclusively determined a relevant point of
law, federal judges are not free to implement their personal notions of
justice. 17 Instead, they must make an educated guess regarding how they
believe the state courts would rule if presented the same issue. 18 The task
facing the court in Bair was to determine whether the failure by the
supreme court to agree on a common rationale rendered the opinion of
Chief Justice Jones a mere deviation from the orderly administration of
Restatement 402A,' 9 or whether it charted an entirely new path in the
development of strict liability principles.
The court's basic approach was to follow the Pennsylvania rules of
12. 402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976).
13. Judge Huyett concluded that the "unreasonably dangerous" standard serves two
functions. First, it is
intended to foreclose the possibility that "defective condition" might be construed
to include any characteristic of a product capable of inflicting injury.
[Second], it signifies that jurors should not resort to their intuitive understanding of
"defective condition" but rather that they should be guided by an objective
standard based on community expectations of product safety.
402 F. Supp. at 1274. This helps to assure that the seller will not become an insurer for his
product in contravention of the policy of Restatement 402A. See notes 36-39 and accompany-
ing text infra.
14. See note 34 infra.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
16. Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 1968).
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970) provides that "[t]he laws of the several states . . . shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply." This provision, with slight modifications, corresponds to § 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92, 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940). Until 1938 it was held that "the laws
of the several states" specified in the act included only those enactments promulgated by the
legislature or long established by local custom. The decisions of a state court were, at most,
only evidence of what the laws were in that state. Consequently, they were not binding upon
the federal courts. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In 1938 the United States
Supreme Court held that the official pronouncements of the states' highest courts were "the
laws of the several states" within the meaning of § 34. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). Since 1938, in diversity cases, the federal courts have applied the substantive law of
the state while following the federal rules of procedure. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965).
17. See, e.g., Kline v. Wheels by Kinney, Inc., 464 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1972).
18. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64(1938); cf. Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488
F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1973). In the latter case the court held that Restatement 402A was the law
of Utah and expanded its coverage to include bystanders, despite the fact that no court of
Utah had ever adopted 402A. The court reasoned that, if confronted with the opportunity, the
Utah Supreme Court would, in all likelihood, adopt 402A.
19. See Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Judge
Huyett concluding that the Jones opinion "threatens to disrupt the orderly administration of
justice in this litigation-prone area of the law").
stare decisis. 20 In Pennsylvania, if a majority2' of the justices join in one
opinion, the legal principles enunciated in that opinion are accorded
precedential value. 22 If concurring opinions are written, precedential value
is established only for those principles upon which the opinions are in
agreement. 23 In addition, the combined number of justices adhering to
those opinions must equal a majority of the court. 24 Problems arise when a
number of justices merely concur in the result or when one opinion
addresses several issues while the concurring opinions are limited to a
rather narrow range of issues. In resolving this problem Pennsylvania
courts adhere to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.25 When a
concurring justice fails to address certain issues raised by the other justices,
his concurrence is not counted as an affirmance of those issues. 26 The
expression of concurrence upon one issue is interpreted as an exclusion of
concurrence on all other issues addressed by the other justices. Similarly,
when a justice merely concurs in the result, his silence is interpreted as a
repudiation of the reasoning enunicated in any of the written opinions.
27
Based upon these principles, the court in Bair made a proper resolu-
tion of the case. 28 Since any combination of the Berkebile opinions would
fail to muster majority status on any issue of the law,29 it may be argued that
20. Stare decisis is the
[dioctrine that, when [a] court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to
a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future
cases, where [the] facts are substantially the same (citation omitted) [r]egardless of
whether the parties and property are the same.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1577 (4th ed. 1951). Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court once defined the doctrine of stare decisis as "the viaduct over which the law
travels in transporting the precious cargo of justice." Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 176,
142 A.2d 263, 270 (1958) (dissent).
21. A "majority" of the court is determined with reference to the total number of
justices participating in the consideration of the case, not the total number of justices sitting
on the court. Commonwealth v. Mason, 456 Pa. 602, 604, 322 A.2d 357, 358 (1974).
22. Id. (opinion by three justices considered binding precedent when two justices
dissented and two did not participate in the consideration of the case).
23. Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1975); seeBata
v. Cent.-Penn Nat'l Bank, 448 Pa. 355, 293 A.2d 343 (1972) (opinion by two justices,
concurring opinion by two justices, and one justice dissenting; binding precedent established
only by those principles of law upon which the principal and concurring opinions were in
accord).
24. Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
25. Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692
(4th ed. 1951).
26. Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see Bata
v. Cent.-Penn Nat'l Bank, 448 Pa. 355, 293 A.2d 343 (1972).
27. See Commonwealth v. Davenport, 462 Pa. 543, 559 n.3, 342 A.2d 67,75 n.3 (1975)
(opinion by three justices has no binding precedential value when three justices concurred in
the result and the chief justice dissented); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 444 Pa. 122, 278 A.2d
895 (1971) (opinion by three justices has no binding precedential value when four justices
concurred in the result); Commonwealth v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 248 A.2d 32 (1968) (opinion by
two justices has no binding precedential value when two justices concurred in the result and
three justices dissented).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Silverman, 442 Pa. 211, 218 n.8, 275 A.2d 308, 312 n.8 (1971)
(opinion by one justice has no binding precedential value when two justices concurred in the
result and two justices dissented). In Silverman the refusal to follow the prior case was
expressed in a footnote and the case was distinguished on other grounds in the text. In Burak
v. Commonwealth, 339 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1972), it was held that language in a footnote
that is unnecessary to the decision in the case does not have binding precedential value. Thus,
the principle enunciated in Silverman may itself be of little precedential value.
28. See note II and accompanying text supra.
29. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
Berkebile was a mere exercise in judicial obfuscation. Nevertheless
although subsequent opinions have not adhered to the rejection of the
"unreasonably dangerous" standard,30 Berkebile has been credited with
certain precedential value. 31 Thus, Berkebileis certainly not a dead issue in
the area of Pennsylvania strict liability and all courts may not wish to
follow the pattern established in Bair.
In Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co.32 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adopted a different approach 33 to
applying relevant Pennsylvania law to a 402A controversy. The court
examined the utility of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard and
concluded that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania could not have intended
to abandon this test without providing a new standard by which a jury could
determine if a product was defective. 34 It is this approach that may
ultimately determine whether Bair was a minor impediment in the
administration of 402A theories, or a major factor in redirecting the orderly
development of Pennsylvania strict liability.
In 196635 Restatement 402A was adopted verbatim as the law of
Pennsylvania. The theory behind 402A is that
the seller, by marketing his product . . . has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it; . . . that public
policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against
which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer
of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the
hands of. . . those who market the products.
3 6
30. The precedential value of the Jones opinion has been questioned in Zurzola v.
General Motors Corp., 69 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1975), as well as in Bair and Beron.
31. Peeke v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 403 F. Supp. 70,71 n.2(E.D. Pa. 1975); McCown
v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 16 n.2, 342 A.2d 381, 382 n.2 (1975); Cornell
Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 359 A.2d 822, 828 (1976); Agostina v.
Rockwell Mfg. Co., 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 434, 445, 345 A.2d 735, 740 (1975).
32. 402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mer., 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976).
33. The basic tenor of the Beron decision was its rejection of Berkebileon the basis of
the utility of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard. After an exhaustive analysis Judge
Huyett did conclude that he need not have resolved the "troublesome questions about the
meaning of Berkebile" since the Jones opinion was not binding under the doctrine of stare
decisis. 402 F. Supp. at 1276.
34. Judge Huyett held that
[i]n the absence of an unequivocal rejection of any specific aspect of 402A by a
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court we hesitate to impute such an
intention to that court . . . . [W]e believe that the phrase "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to users" is a unitary concept and that the purpose of the
draftsmen would be frustrated by severing from it "unreasonably dangerous"
without substituting another suitable phrase which tends to clarify the meaning of
"defective condition."
402 F. Supp. at 1273-74. Until Berkebile the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had often relied
upon the comments to Restatement 402A in resolving questions of its interpretation and trial
judges had often utilized these comments when formulating jury instructions. Id. at 1274
nn.13, 14. In light of these developments Judge Huyett apparently desired a stronger
manifestation of intent to reject comment i than could be found in an opinion signed by only
two out of seven justices.
35. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
36. Restatement 402A, supra note 4, comment c at 349-50 (1965); cf. Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring);
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099,
1112 (1960).
This judicially imposed enterprise liability is not intended to make the
seller37 insure that his product would nevercause an injury. 38 Rather, it is
intended that the seller would guarantee 39 that his product is free from any
defects that may cause injury to the consumer. 4° In order to implement this
policy and to protect the seller as well as consumers, Restatement 402A
requires that the product be in a defective condition.4 Realizing that juries
would need some standard by which to determine if a product is defec-
tive,42 the draftsmen of the Restatement provided that a product is defective
if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." 43 It is this definition of
defectiveness that led Chief Justice Jones to conclude that negligence
standards were being injected into 402A actions.' The Chief Justice stated
that the "crucial difference between strict liability and negligence is that
the existence of due care, whether on the part of the seller or consumer, is
irrelevant." 45 Raising the issue whether a reasonable consumer would
have been aware of the defect places the burden upon the plaintiff to prove
that he exercised due care. 46 Chief Justice Jones felt that this burden has no
place in strict liability since it "rings of negligence." 
47
In only two other cases have courts held that the standard established
in comment i of Restatement 402A injects negligence standards into 402A
actions. In 1972 the California Supreme Court held that the objective
37. The term "seller" is defined to include "any person engaged in the business of
selling products for use or consumption." Restatement 402A, supra note 4, comment f'at
350-51 (1965). The seller must be engaged in the sale of the particular product as part of his
business in order to come under the mandate of Restatement 402A. Id.
38. See Wade, On the Nature ofStrict Tort Liability forProducts, 44 MIss. L.J. 825, 826
(1973); cf. Restatement 402A, supra note 4, comment i at 352-53 (1965), establishing that a
seller is not liable for an injury caused by his product when the injury does not result from any
defect in the product, as when a person becomes sick from an overconsumption of alcohol.
Contra, Pritchard v. Leggitt & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
39. E.g., Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.,457 Pa. 24,32,319 A.2d 903,907(1974).
40. The term "consumer" is defined to include those who make use of the product in
any manner for which it was intended as well as those who passively enjoy the benefits of the
product. RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, comment I at 354 (1965).
41. See RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, comment g at 351 (1965).
42. Judge Huyett concluded that without the Restatement standard a jury would have to
resort to "bare intuition" in order to determine if a product was defective. 402 F. Supp. at
1275. The need for a standard by which the product can be judged defective has been deemed
particularly critical in cases like Bair in which the alleged defect is in the design of the product.
See note 63 infra. In such cases even an intuitive approach may be of little help since the
finished product is in a form intended by the manufacturer. See 80 DICK. L. REV. 633, 637
(1976).
43. RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, comment i at 352 (1965) (emphasis added).
44. While Chief Justice Jones specifically limited his discussion to comment i of
Restatement 402A the same reasonable man standard may be found in comments g and h.
Comment gdefines a defective product as one "not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Comment h provides that a product "is not in
a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption." RESTATEMENT
402A, supra note 4, comments g, h, at 351 (1965) (emphasis added).
45. 462 Pa. at 94, 337 A.2d at 899.
46. RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, comment nat 356(1965) provides that contribut-
ory negligence of the plaintiff that "consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence" is not a defense to 402A actions.
Thus, even if the plaintiff failed to prove that he had used due care, the seller would not escape
liability.
47. 462 Pa. at 96, 337 A.2d at 899, quotingCronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 12 1,
132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433. 442 (1972).
consumer standard of comment i burdened the plaintiff with proof of a
negligence concept and subverted the policy goals of 402A as a form of
enterprise liability. 48 The solution adopted by the California court was to
abandon Restatement 402A in toto and develop its own form of strict
49liability.
The only other court to reject the "unreasonably dangerous" standard
was the Superior Court of New Jersey in 1973.50 The New Jersey court also
concluded that the Restatement standard injected negligence concepts into
402A actions and subverted the policy goals of strict liability. Its solution
was to retain Restatement 402A minus the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement. 5' While Chief Justice Jones referred to these cases as support
for his assessment of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard,52 his failure
to indicate whether Pennsylvania was to adopt either of these solutions or
create a new standard for determining defectiveness has led to diverse
interpretations of his opinion.
Although language may be found in Berkebile to indicate that Chief
Justice Jones sought to adopt the solutions of California 53 and New
Jersey,54 a further reading may indicate that he was attempting to retain the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement while adopting a new standard of
defectiveness. The Chief Justice concluded that a plaintiff has established a
prima facie case for recovery if he proves "that there was a defect in the
product and that the defect caused his injury . . .[and] if he sustains this
burden he will have proved that as to him the product was unreasonably
dangerous." 55 With this interpretation, the test would change from an
objective consumer standard under comment i to a subjective consumer
standard based upon the knowledge and expectations of the individual
plaintiff. 56 In 1972 the California Supreme Court rejected this subjective
consumer approach since it directly placed the burden upon the plaintiff of
48. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,134,501 P.2d 1153, 1162, lO4Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972). Justice Sullivan concluded that if the objective consumer standard is applied,
a plaintiff may be denied recovery even though he was unaware of any defect if the "ordinary
consumer" would have been aware of such defect. This result would erase strict liability as a
seller's guarantee that his product is free from any harmful defects and would allow the seller
to escape liability based upon the consumer's negligence in not discovering the defect.
49. The court in Cronin affirmed the approach developed in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), the first case to apply
strict liability principles to sellers of products. In Greenman the court held that a plaintiff may
recover if he was injured while using the product in a manner in which it was intended to be
used and such injury resulted from a defect in the product. Id. Chief Justice Jones adopted
basically this approach when he held that "[sitrict liability requires, in substance, only two
elements of requisite proof: the need to prove that the product was defective, and the need to
prove that the defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries." 462 Pa. at 93-94, 337
A.2d at 898 (footnote omitted).
50. Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (Law Div. 1973).
51. Id. at 603, 304 A.2d at 564-65. But see Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133
N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (Law Div. 1975).
52. 462 Pa. at 96-97, 337 A.2d at 900.
53. See note 49 supra.
54. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
55. 462 Pa. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900 (emphasis added).
56. If the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately adopts this approach, jury
instructions employing the subjective consumer standard may be found in California Jury
Instructions, Civil, Nos. 9.00, 9.01 (1969).
establishing that he was not aware of any defect in the product.57 This same
criticism was leveled by Chief Justice Jones against the Restatement
standard, but he concluded that the objective standard indirectly placed this
burden upon the plaintiff. 58 Thus, if a new standard was being suggested,
its value in rectifying the problems of Restatement 402A is questionable.
Berkebile was interpreted differently by Judge Huyett, who held that
the "unreasonably dangerous" standard had not been exorcised from
402A actions. Under Judge Huyett's interpretation, any instruction that
properly focused the attention of the jury on the product and away from the
actions of the consumer or seller59 would survive the Berkebile opinion.
6°
It must be remembered that these tests are merely shortcuts for
determining when a product is defective. Controversy results from at-
tempts to determine if the test diverts the jury's attention away from the
product and to the seller or consumer. A better approach is to utilize a
bifurcated test. First, a product should be defined as defective if it deviates
from the norm of other products. 6' This norm could be established by
looking to the same line of products if the alleged defect arose in the course
of manufacture, 62 or to similar products produced by other manufacturers if
the alleged defect arose from the design of the product.63 Once the product
is found to be defective the imposition of liability would become a policy
57. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 143, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
58. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
59. Dean Wade has suggested an alternative test for defectiveness based upon an
objective seller standard. Under Wade's test a product would be "defective" if the seller
would have been acting unreasonably in placing it upon the market had he been aware of the
defect at the time of sale. Wade contends that this standard would prevent the seller from
becoming an insurer since there are cases in which, even if the defect had been known, the
seller would not have been acting unreasonably in placing products on the market. Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15-17 (1965). This test also maintains the
distinction between strict liability and negligence because there is no need for the plaintiff to
prove that the seller should have known of the defect by the exercise of due care. Instead,
scienteron the part of the seller is a controlled element since it is presumed at the time of the
trial. See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect "in the Manufacture and
Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 568 (1969). The Wade "reasonable seller" test
was applied in Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Chief Justice Jones
specifically rejected this objective seller test holding that it injected the same negligence
concepts into 402A actions and thus diluted the effects of strict liability in the same manner as
Restatement 402A comment i. 462 Pa. at 95-96 n.6, 337 A.2d at 899 n.6.
60. See Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975), for
an instruction which Judge Huyett believes would properly comport with the Berkebile
standards.
61. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965).
62. SeeCronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 124,501 P.2d 1153, 1155-56, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 435-36 (1972) (a good illustration of an alleged defect that arose during the
course of manufacture).
63. The facts in Bair provide a good illustration of an alleged defect that existed as the
result of product design. Mrs. Bair was injured in an accident in which her 1966 Rambler was
struck from the side directly behind the driver's door. This collision caused the driver's door
to open and sent the Rambler into a spin. Mrs. Bair sustained multiple injuries when she was
thrown from the vehicle through the open door. Her expert witness testified that the ratchet
assembly that held the door closed was protected only in the front while the upper portion and
sides were not enclosed. As early as the 1961-62 model year some manufacturers had
instituted the use of a T-head bolt assembly to enclose the ratchet on the top, sides and
bottom. The expert testified that without this assembly the door was more likely to open when
subjected to upward and longitudinal pressures such as occurred in the Bair accident. By 1963
such findings were widely known through the automobile industry. Bair v. American Motors,
473 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1973).
determination. This determination would rest upon a comparison of the
utility of the product with the degree of danger inherent in the defect.
64
Restatement 402A abandons the objective consumer test and employs this
social utility standard in cases of unavoidably unsafe products.65 What has
been suggested is that this standard be applied to all products. 66 It would
maintain strict liability as an entity separate from negligence 67 since the
imposition of liability would be resolved by focusing upon the product's
defects rather than the seller's acts. In addition, the use of the social utility
standard would serve to implement the enterprise liability goals of Restate-
ment 402A since the seller would be held to guarantee that his product was
no more dangerous than society would permit.
While the decision in Bairrested comfortably upon a solid foundation
of stare decisis, the future development of Pennsylvania 402A actions must
entail a more thorough analysis of the "unreasonably dangerous" stand-
dard. In light of the diverse and conflicting interpretations of comment i,
serious consideration should be given to adopting a new standard that more
properly focuses the jury's attention upon the product. If such a standard is
developed it should directly implement the policy goals of Restatement
402A and free the courts from adhering to meticulous standards in forming
jury instructions. Until such time as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
clarifies its reasoning on 402A, many courts may wish to adopt the safe
approach exemplified in Bair.
64. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
837-38 (1973) (discussion of relevant factors that should be considered in this balancing
process).
65. See RESTATEMENT 402A, supra note 4, comment k at 353-54 (1965).
66. Cf. note 64 and accompanying text supra. Judge Huyett implied in Beron that the
"unreasonably dangerous" standard did impose a societal judgment of defectiveness since
jury members were "guided by an objective standard based on community expectations of
product safety." 402 F. Supp. at 1274. While the judge correctly assessed the community
standard, under comment i this standard is utilized to create the expectations of the consumer
prior to the infliction of injury instead of being invoked at the time of the trial to implement a
societal judgment of the defectiveness of the product. Under the one standard the community
is utilized to pass society's judgment on whether the acts of the plaintiff were reasonable,
while under the other the societal values are brought to bear on the question whether the
product is more defective than society will tolerate. While Judge Huyett asserts that a
properly drawn instruction would focus the jury's attention upon the product, see note 60 and
accompanying text supra, the critical care with which such instructions must be drawn and the
potential for error would serve as a sufficient rationale for abandoning the Restatement
standard and adopting a more direct approach.
67. See RESTATEMENT 402A(2)(a), quoted at note 4 supra.
[Casenote by Eugene Mikolajczyk]
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRIcT TORT LIABILITY-LESSOR OF VEHI-
CLES LIABLE TO INJURED BYSTANDER. Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental,
Inc., - Del. -, 353 A.2d 581 (1976).
In Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
announced that a lessor in the normal course of business may be held
strictly liable in tort to third party bystanders for injuries proximately
caused by defects in leased vehicles. In so holding, the court added
Delaware to the growing list of states2 that have applied the doctrine of
strict tort liability3 to bailments and leases.
In the normal course of business, defendant had leased a truck to a
corporation under a "lease and service agreement." 4 While an employee
of the lessee corporation was operating the truck, the brakes failed and the
truck struck the rear of a stationary vehicle, causing it to collide with
plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff and her husband sued on the theory of strict tort
liability to recover for personal injuries and property damage. The superior
court held for defendant because Delaware had not previously adopted the
strict tort liability doctrine in any form. 5 The supreme court reversed,
adopting the doctrine in the limited context of bailment-lease transactions. 6
In considering plaintiff's appeal, the supreme court concluded that the
case would be resolved by considering three issues: first, whether Dela-
I. -Del. -, 353 A.2d 581 (1976).
2. Twelve states have extended strict tort liability to bailments and leases: Alaska
(Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970)); California (Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d
245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970)); Connecticut (Whitfield v. Cooper, 30 Conn. Supp.
47, 298 A.2d 50 (1972)); Florida (W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 238 So.
2d 98 (Fla. 1970)); Hawaii (Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 52 Hawaii 71,470 P.2d 240 (1970));
Illinois (Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 I11. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971)); Nebraska
(Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973)); New Jersey
(Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965)); New
Mexico (Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972)); Oklahoma (Coleman v.
Hertz Corp., 534 P.2d 940 (Okla. App. 1975)); Oregon (Summers v. Interstate Tractor &
Equip. Co., 466 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1972)); Texas (Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974)).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), the most widely quoted version of
the doctrine of strict tort liability, states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (i) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
4. - Del. at -, 353 A.2d at 582 n.I.
5. Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., No. 73-661 (Del. Super. Ct., Oct. 21, 1974).
6. - Del. at -. 353 A.2d at 588-89.
ware's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code-in particular the
warranty sections on sales-pre-empted the products liability field as to
bailment-leases; 7 second, whether the court should apply the strict tort
doctrine to bailments and leases; 8 and third, if the doctrine does apply,
whether a cause of action should extend to an injured bystander.
9
With little elaboration,' 0 the court read literally the warranty provi-
sions of sections 2-313 and 2-315,11 determining that the Code is limited to
sales of goods and is neutral with regard to other types of transactions.'
2
The court therefore concluded that legislative silence concerning bailment-
leases could not be construed to pre-empt application of strict tort liability
to those transactions.' 3 Accordingly, the court considered itself "free, in
the common law tradition, to apply the doctrine of strict tort liability to a
bailment lease." '
4
The second issue, whether the doctrine of strict tort liability should
be applied to a bailment-lease in Delaware, was accorded more careful
treatment. Noting that this was an issue of first impression, the court
reviewed the historical evolution of the doctrine of strict tort liability in
other jurisdictions. 15 Observing that strict tort liability "is now the rule in
approximately two-thirds of the states, including Pennsylvania and New
Jersey,' ' 16 the court noted that the doctrine
has developed in a 'step by step' process out of the law of
contract warranty into the law of tort, for the purpose of the
greater protection of the user and the public against defective
goods by eliminating the 'luggage' and 'undesirable complica-
tions' of the contract-warranty remedy in direct sales transac-
tions .... 17
7. Id. at-, 353 A.2d at 583-84.
8. Id. at -, 353 A.2d at 584-87.
9. Id. at -, 353 A.2d at 587-88.
10. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
i1. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 2-313 provides in pertinent part:
Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample.
(I) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 2-315 provides in pertinent part:
Implied warranty; fitness for particular purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
12. - Del. at -, 353 A.2d at 584 & n.6.
13. Id. at-, 353 A.2d at 584.
14. Id.
15. Id. at-, 353 A.2d at 584-87.
16. Id. at -,353 A.2d at 584 & n.8, citingSantor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44N.J.
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
17. Id. at -, 353 A.2d at 584. The change from "warranty" to "tort" is explained by
Dean Prosser as follows:
[It gradually became apparent that warranty, as a device for the justification of
strict liability to the consumer, carries far too much luggage in the way of
undesirable complications, and is more trouble than it is worth. The suggestion was
therefore a sufficiently obvious one, that we get rid of the word, which was
The court then retraced the steps of this development: the extension of
strict warranty liability to products other than food and drink in Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,' 8 the application of strict tort liability to a
remote manufacturer in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 19 the
adoption of the Yuba rationale by New Jersey in Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc. ,20 and the extension of strict tort liability to bailment-
lessors in the regular course of business in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing
& Rental Service.2 1 The Martin court was impressed by the consensus of
leading authorities that the "paramount policy [promoted by strict tort
liability] . . . is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manu-
facturing defects and the spreading throughout society of the cost of
compensating them." 22 The court was "of the opinion that . . . the
common law must grow to fulfill the requirements of justice as dictated by
changing times and conditions." 23 Accordingly, public policy considera-
tions dictated a holding that the doctrine of strict tort liability was
applicable in the present case.
Having decided that strict tort liability should apply to lessor defend-
ants, the court considered the third issue, whether the doctrine should be
available to injured bystanders. Endorsing the holding of Elmore v.
American Motors Corp.24 that bystanders should be protected if their
injury is reasonably foreseeble, 25 and noting that "[b]ystander recovery is
the prevailing rule in the application of the doctrine of strict tort liability by
the overwhelming weight of authority," 26 the court held that "[f]airness
and logic, as well as the philosophy underlying the doctrine, require that an
injured bystander be covered in its application. "27
Although the Martin resolutions to the second and third issues are
justifiable as a matter of public policy, their theoretical validity is
dependent upon the answer to the first issue. Failure adequately to address
the pre-emption question subjects the case's holding, right or wrong, to
theoretical challenge.
This failure reflects the court's apparent eagerness to join the surging
originally adopted only because it provided a theory ready to hand to accomplish
the desired result.
The proposal fell upon receptive ears when the drafting group of the Second
Restatement of Torts encountered great difficulty in stating a new Section, without
running afoul of the statutory limitations on 'warranty.' They therefore discarded
the term ....
This Section was approved by the American Law Institute.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 656-57 (4th Ed. 1971).
18. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
19. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
20. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
21. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). California in turn adopted this position in Price v.
Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
22. - Del. at -, 353 A.2d at 586.
23. Id. at -, 353 A.2d at 587.
24. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
25. Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
26. - Del. at -, 353 A.2d at 588.
27. Id. at -, 353 A.2d at 588.
tide of decisions "assaulting the citadel" 28 of recovery limitations based
on contract, warranty, negligence and privity concepts. As this issue was
downplayed, telling arguments both for and against UCC pre-emption
remained unconsidered.
The Martin court's conclusion that the UCC does not pre-empt
judicially provided products liability causes of action in the bailment-lease
field depends upon restrictive construction of the Code, i.e., a construction
that limits its application solely to "sales" transactions. 29 Numerous
courts, however, have held that the coverage of Article 2 must be broadly
construed to apply to transactions other than sales. 30 In support of this
position, they have cited the language of section 2-102 that "[u]nless the
context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods
... , "31 The Martin court totally ignored this argument in its disposition
of the pre-emption question.
Precedent exists, to be sure, for the proposition that Article 2 of the
Code applies only to sales. 32 Moreover, although no prior Delaware case is
on point, a federal court has interpreted Delaware law to this effect. 33
Furthermore, it has been noted that because several other sections of the
Code refer specifically to leases, one might conclude that had the drafters
intended that article 2 apply to leases they would have stated so expressly."
Concomitantly, the Code was the subject of "extensive study and debate"
and "if the draftsmen had intended the [warranty] sections to apply to
leases of goods as well as to sales, they should have said so." 35 Thus, while
the Martin resolution of the pre-emption issue may be justifiable, it is
weakened by the court's failure to analyze arguments both for and against
Code pre-emption of strict tort liability causes of action.36
The significance of Martin is emphasized by a comparison of the
28. "Assaulting the citadel" alludes to two articles by Dean Prosser in which he
detailed and propounded the rise of the theory of strict tort liability. See Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
29. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
30. See, e.g., Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204,484 P.2d 573 (1971); Newmark v. Gimbels,
Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d
992, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Ciunci v. Wella Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 109, 271
N.Y.S.2d 317 (1966).
31. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102.
32. Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972); Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 265
Ore. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973).
33. ICI America, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 368 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Del. 1974).
34. Comment, Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leases,
1969 WASH. U. L.Q. 90, 94 (1969). The sections are UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(37),
9-102(2), 9-105(l)(h).
35. Bona v. Graefe, 265 Md. 69, 71, 285 A.2d 607, 609 (1972).
36. The Martin court observed in a footnote that it was not deciding whether the Code
pre-empted the field as to sales:
Reserved for another day is the question of whether the Legislature has
preempted the field as to direct sales cases and whether the warranty provisions of
the UCC are, therefore, the exclusive source of strict liability in such cases.
- Del. at -, 353 A.2d at 584 n.7. If the Code does pre-empt as to sales, but not as to
bailment-leases, an anomaly results: a plaintiff in a bailment-lease case may avail himself of
the strict tort liability cause of action, while a plaintiff in a sales case is restricted to Code
causes of action. The impeachability of this result in light of the historical development of the
law casts doubt upon the Martin court's resolution of the pre-emption issue.
limitations of the warranty provisions of the Code37 and the doctrine of
strict tort liability as expressed in section 402A of the Restatment of
Torts. 38 UCC warranty liability may be limited by disclaimer or by failure
to give notice. The section 402A strict tort liability theory, however,
rejects both of these limitations. Given the choice, therefore, consumer
plaintiffs and injured bystanders are likely to choose the strict tort theory. 
39
In the case of persons injured as the proximate result of defects in leased
vehicles, Martin now provides Delaware plaintiffs that choice.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ENTRY OF NOLLE PROSEQUI DOES NOT TOLL
SPEEDY TRIAL PERIOD SPECIFIED BY PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE 1100. Commonwealth v. Whitaker, - Pa. -, 359
A.2d 174 (1976).
In Commonwealth v. Whitaker' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
dealt a crippling but nonfatal blow to the nolle prosequi. 2 Reasoning that
this ancient prosecutorial device was being used contrary to the purpose for
which it was originally devised,3 a unanimous4 court refused to tolerate its
expression as a simple expedient to evade the definite5 time limits specified
by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100.6 The court concluded
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 2-316; note 39 infra.
38. See note 3 supra (text of section 402A).
39. For further discussion of this point, see Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 755 (1970).
[Casenote by Jeffrey T. Tucker]
I. - Pa. -, 359 A.2d 174 (1976).
2. Nolle prosequi is defined as
a formal entry on the record by the prosecuting officer by which he declares that he
will not prosecute the cases further, either as to some of the counts of the
indictment, or as to parts of a divisible count, or as to some of the persons accused,
or altogether.
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §456, at 1 (1961). For discussion of the function of the nolle prosequi
in Pennsylvania see notes 13-18, 33 and accompanying text infra.
3. The nolle prosequi was originally entered by the attorney general in cases instituted
by private prosecutors that were not tried for two or three terms. The rationale was that "it is
not reason that the subject should be molested or attendant so long without just cause."
Stretton & Taylor's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 111 (K.B. 1588). It also was used to clear fatally
defective indictments so that new ones could be returned that would support convictions. See
Emery, The Nolle Prosequi in Criminal Cases, 6 ME. L. REV. 199 (1913); 41 N.Y.U. L. RFV.
996 (1966). But in Whitaker, the nolle prosequi "was simply an effort to gain an extension of
the time period within which to bring appellee to trial." - Pa. at -, 359 A.2d at 177.
4. Justice Eagen concurred in the result.
5. Commonwealth v. Woods, 461 Pa. 255, 258, 336 A.2d 273, 274 (1975).
6. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100 is the prompt trial rule adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court pursuant to its rule-making powers under article 5, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania
constitution. Its basic provision is that a defendant must be tried within 180 days of the date of
filing of the criminal complaint. If he is not, the charges must be dismissed with prejudice. See
generally Comment, The Pennsylvania Prompt Trial Rule: Is the Remedy Worse Than the
Disease?, 81 DICK. L. REV. 237 (1977); Comment, Speedy Trial Guarantees in Pennsylvania:
The Impact of Rule 1100, 78 DICK. L. REV. 755 (1974).
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that rule 1100(C), 7 and not the nolle prosequi, is the proper mechanism by
which to extend the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial.
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 100(a)(1), the
Commonwealth was required to bring James Whitaker to trial within two
hundred and seventy days of his arrest for murder. Nevertheless, his case
was continuously rescheduled from day to day and courtroom to courtroom
as a "back-up." 8 With only two of those two hundred and seventy days
remaining, the prosecution was permitted to enter a nolle prosequi9 over
the objection of Whitaker's counsel. Two months later the district attorney
petitioned to vacate the nolle prosequi. The court, however, granted
Whitaker's motion to dismiss with prejudice because rule 1100 had been
violated. '0
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Commonwealth
contended that the prompt trial period was tolled by the entry of the nolle
prosequi so long as the defendant's speedy trial right, as defined in Barker
v. Wingo,II had not been violated. The court's rejection of this argument
subordinated the convenience of the prosecutor to the interests of the
defendant and society in the expeditious administration of criminal justice.
But the positive effect that this may have in resolving related prompt trial
questions and in avoiding the evasive tactics of prosecutors has been
limited by an easing of the time extension requirements of rule 1100(c).' 2
7. PA. R. CRIM. P. l100(c) provides in part that the prosecutor will be granted a
continuance "only if trial cannot be commenced within the specified period despite due
diligence by the Commonwealth. Any order granting such application shall specify the date or
period within which trial shall be commenced." Seenotes 31-34 and accompanying text infra.
8. Commonwealth v. Whitaker, - Pa.-, 359 A.2d 174 (1976), Brief for Appellee at 2.
9. - Pa. at -, 359 A.2d at 175. The Commonwealth sought a nolle prosequi for two
reasons: its chief prosecuting witness refused to testify, and certain incriminating statements
had been supressed.
10. The court attached no significance to Whitaker's assertion of his prompt trial right
in determining that rule 1100 had been violated. The question remains whether the same result
would have been reached if he had acquiesced in the entry of the nolle prosequi. In
Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth must establish from the record that the defendant's waiver
of a constitutional right was voluntary and informed. Commonwealth v. Myrick, - Pa. -, -,
360 A.2d 598, 600 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 452 Pa. 397, 305 A.2d 25 (1973). But
Whitaker asserted a right based upon a rule of criminal procedure that is "neither directly
granted nor required by the Constitution." Commonwealth v. Myrick, - Pa. -, -, 360 A.2d
598, 600 (1976). Thus, while any waiver of the constitutional right to a speedy trial will
certainly be a waiver of the right to a prompt trial under rule 1100, it is difficult to ascertain
whether some lesser standard may be employed in determining the waiver of rule 1100 rights.
11. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Barker standard for determining whether an accused's
right to a speedy trial has been violated is a balancing test comprised of four factors: (I) length
of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant's assertion of speedy trial right, and (4) prejudice
to the defendant because of the delay. Id. at 530-33. This four-factor approach, however, has
"no talismanic qualities." Id. at 533.
In Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 306, 297 A.2d 127, 131-32 (1972), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Barker's balancing test because "experience has
demonstrated that under this type of approach, there has been little success in eliminating
criminal backlogs in populous counties where delays and the evils they create are most
severe." The court preferred a fixed-time rule. This resulted in its adoption of Rule 1100. See
PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100, comment. The question whether this procedural rule was to be used in
addition to or in place of the balancing test remained. It was answered by Whitaker.
Rule 1100 provides the one method (as opposed to Barker v. Wingo's "balancing
test") by which the courts of Pennsylvania are to determine whether an accused's
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The test mandated by rule
1100 is the only test to be applied . . .to determine a speedy trial claim.
- Pa. at -, 359 A.2d at 176 (emphasis added).
12. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text infra.
Although in Pennsylvania the nolle prosequi has been modified by
court rule and statute,13 it retains much of its common-law flavor. 4 The
nolle prosequi has traditionally been a matter of prosecutorial discretion,
and the district attorney alone has the power to enter it. '5 Now, however, its
entry is subject to court approval. 16 Its most distinctive feature, and the real
source of concern in Whitaker, is that the nolle prosequi bars neither
subsequent indictment for the same offense' 7 nor fresh process on the
original indictment.1 8 This characteristic clashes with rules and statutes
that limit the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial.
Most courts faced with this apparent impass have concluded that the
prompt trial period begins anew upon the issuance of a second indictment
after the first has been nolle prossed. 9 The primary rationale for this rule is
that the nolle prosequi renders the original indictment a nullity. 20 Thus,
until the second indictment is found, the defendant is no longer an accused
within the meaning of the sixth amendment21 and has no right to a speedy
indictment. 22 In order to be prosecuted the defendant must be reindicted,
13. Statutes and court rules in Pennsylvania have modified the nolle prosequi by
requiring that the district attorney obtain judicial approval of its entry and by permitting its
entry by a complainant, with the prosecutor's assent, upon a showing of satisfaction for a
minor offense. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 314, 315; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 492 (1964).
14. See note 3 supra.
15. Agnew v. Cumberland County Comm'rs, 12 S. & R. 94 (Pa. 1824); Commonwealth
v. Shields, 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 266 (1926) (court may not force prosecutor to enter nolle
prosequi); Commonwealth v. Reed, 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 91 (1916).
16. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 314. According to this rule, the petition may still be granted
"notwithstanding the objection of any person." See Commonwealth v. Blatt, 13 Bucks 437
(Pa. C.P. 1963) (district attorney's power to enter a nolle prosequi may not be contested);
Commonwealth v. Evans, 26 Pa. County Ct. 90 (C.P. Colum. 1901). The defendant, however,
must be given the opportunity to be heard. See Commonwealth v. Reinhart, - Pa. -, 353
A.2d 848 (1976), wherein the court construed the language in PA. R. CRIM. P. 314 as follows:
The challenged language merely means that a criminal defendant does not have an
absolute right to be tried on demand. A motion for nolle prosequi is treated like any
other motion. . . . The rule in no way bars the presentation of objections by the
defendant nor does it direct the trial court to ignore these objections. It merely
states that the defendant's objections is not dispositive of the case.
Id. at -, 353 A.2d at 851-52. The court concluded that operation of the rule did not work a
denial of due process.
17. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 142 A.2d 213 (1968).
18. Agnew v. Cumberland County Comm'rs, 12 S. & R. 94 (Pa. 1824); Commonwealth
ex rel. Thor v. Ashe, 138 Pa. Super. Ct. 222, II A.2d 173 (1940).
19. States subscribing to this view are Arizona, California, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington.
See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 462 (1953). It is noteworthy that although the rule providing that the
prompt trial period commences upon reindictment is the majority rule, this rationale was not
argued by the Commonwealth, nor was it considered by the Whitaker court.
20. State v. Bige, 198 Iowa 573, 198 N.W. 510 (1924); State v. Fink, 217 Kan. 671,538
P.2d 1390 (1975); State v. Wigger, 196 Mo. 90, 93 S.W. 390 (1906). This result is forced upon
some jurisdictions because applicable statutes fail to contemplate delays occasioned by the
defendant, see, e.g., State v. Billings, 140 Mo. 193, 41 S.W. 778 (1897); Mealy v. Common-
wealth, 193 Va. 216, 68 S.E.2d 507 (1952), continuances due to the absence of a material
witness, see, e.g., State v. Goodmiller, 386 P.2d 365 (Idaho 1963), or the contingency of a
reversal and order for a new trial, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Adcock, 8 Gratt 661 (Va. 1851).
21. State v. Ackerman, 27 Conn. Supp. 209,234 A.2d 120 (Super. Ct. 1967); Greathouse
v. State, 5 Md. App. 675, 249 A.2d 207 (1969). It is reasoned in Greathouse that
although an accused has the right to have an outstanding indictment brought to trial
within such time as to afford him a speedy trial, once prosecution can no longer be
pursued upon that indictment, as, for example, by the entry of a nolle prosequi
I he no longer enjoys that right, for the right, under that indictment, is
terminated when the case is so finally determined.
Id. at 685, 249 A.2d at 215.
22. Id.
for fresh process will not be allowed on the original indictment.23
The Commonwealth's contention in Whitaker,24 and the standard
recommended by the ABA, 25 is that the entry of a nolle prosequi will toll
the running of the prompt trial period pending reindictment or fresh
process. This approach recognizes that "[i]f dismissal by the prosecutor
were to operate so as to begin the time running anew upon a subsequent
charge of the same offense, this 'would open the way for the complete
evasion' of the speedy trial rule. " 26 But it does not acknowledge that
prosecutorial evasion is also possible when dismissal merely suspends the
running of the time period. This possibility was forthrightly precluded by
Whitaker:
[T]he purpose of the rule would be wholly frustrated if the
position taken by the prosecution here were to be accepted.
Through the simple expedient of a nolle prosequi, the prosecu-
tion could indefinitely delay an accused's trial, thereby friustrat-
ing the state objective of Rule 1100, while at the same time
escaping the consequences of its violation.
27
By adopting this stance the court has added Pennsylvania to the list of
jurisdictions that categorically refuse to permit the entry of a nolle prosequi
23. In State v. Ackerman, 27 Conn. Supp. 209,234 A.2d 120 (Super. Ct. 1969), the court
stressed that a new information must be based on probable cause and thus distinguished it
from the situation in which it would remain on the docket. Accord, Greathouse v. State, 5 Md.
App. 675, 249 A.2d 207 (1969) (nolle prosequi is not a stet). This distinction between
reindictment and fresh process is not drawn in Pennsylvania, and cannot be justified. The
practical effect of either procedure is to inform the accused that he is believed to have
committed a crime and that, at some indefinite future date, he may be brought to trial.
Comment, Nolle Prosequi in Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REV. 117, 126 (1971).
24. - Pa. at -, 359 A.2d at 175.
25. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.3(f), at 26
(Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA SPEEDY TRIAL]. No state has subscribed to
the ABA approach.
26. Id., comment at 30-31 (emphasis added).
27. - Pa. at-, 359 A.2d at 176. In Philadelphia County, the source of Whitakerand the
county having the highest number of criminal cases processed in the state, the percentage of
cases nolle prossed has dramatically increased since 1973, while the percentage of cases in
which the indictments were quashed or dismissed has correspondingly dropped.
Quashed or Dismissed






See GOVERNOR'S JUSTICE COMMISSION, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL COURT DISPOSITIONS 1971-
1975. These statistics cannot be explained by pre-trial diversion programs, such as acceler-
ated rehabilitative disposition:
The Philadelphia practice has not been to make use of accelerated rehabilitative
disposition programs after indictment. . . .[T]he attorney for the Commonwealth
could nolle pros the charges. However a nolle pros may not be desirable since there
may be a need for some rehabilitative program for defendant, and since defendant
can earn a clean record by participation in this program.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-85, comment (emphasis added). Further, all types of cases disposed of by
pre-trial diversion programs are classified separately from those nolle prossed. These facts
fortify the Whitakercourt's conclusion that the prosecution had been using the nolle prosequi
to avoid the large number of quashed and dismissed indictments that would result from failure
to comply with rule 1100.
to have any effect whatsoever on the running of the prompt trial period. 28
This result is justifiable because any other approach allows prosecutorial
evasion of the speedy trial rules. 29 It is further supported as a recognition
that a defendant's "constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence
determined by trial within a reasonable time cannot be frittered away upon
purely technical and unsubstantial grounds."
30
Whitaker does not preclude all forms of prosecutorial delay. The
district attorney may still seek an extension of the prompt trial period by
petitioning the court pursuant to rule 1 100(c). 3 ' This places no severe
burden on the prosecutor; in fact, it is in some respects easier to obtain an
extension 32 than a nolle prosequi. 33 The real advantage of rule 1100(c)
28. Other states adopting this approach are Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New Jersey, and
West Virginia. Although PA. R. CRIM. P. 314 provides that a nolle prosequi may be entered
with the assent of the court, it does not specify what effect entry will have on the prompt trial
period. Whitakernow clarifies the effect. Nevertheless, either rule 314 or rule 1100 could have
been drafted so as to avoid the issue faced in Whitaker.
29. One court noted that all other approaches are inadequate because
[alny other construction would open the way for the complete evasion of the
statute, as the prosecuting officer, [before the ending of the prompt trial period],
would have only to enter a nolle prosequi to the indictment, have the defendants
held in custody until another indictment could be found, and thus nullify the
provision of the statute.
Brooks v. People, 88 III. 327, 330 (1878).
30. State v. Crawford, 83 W. Va. 556, 559, 98 S.E. 615, 617 (1919). The decision is
further supported by rules of construction requiring that "provisions of a statute shall be
liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice .... " I PA. CONS. STAT. §
1928(c) (1972). Rule 1100 is not a statute; nevertheless, it has the effect of a statute because the
Pennsylvania constitution provides that all laws inconsistent with rules promulgated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court are suspended. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). Thus, statutory rules
of construction interpreting rule 1100 were employed by Justice Eagen in Commonwealth v.
Shelton, - Pa. -, -, 364 A.2d 694,698 (1976). Further, PA. R. CRIM. P. 2 provides that the
rules of criminal procedure shall be construed to eliminate "unjustifiable expense and delay
as nearly as may be in consonance with the rules of statutory construction." Thus, the
Whitaker court could have reached its decision simply on the ground that a nolle prosequi
constituted "unjustifiable delay and expense" when considered in connection with the
prompt trial period.
31. - Pa. at -, 359 A.2d at 177.
32. See note 7 supra.
33. Requirements of judicial approval to enter a nolle prosequi are not based upon any
rule of criminal procedure but have evolved from decisional law. There are two basic
requirements. First, the entry may not interfere with any speedy trial claim that the defendant
may have. Second, the Commonwealth must provide valid reasons in support of its request.
Commonwealth v. Reinhart, - Pa. -, -, 353 A.2d 848, 853 (1976). Determination of the
speedy trial claim has been simplified by adoption of rule 1100. In Whitaker, for example,
since the nolle prosequi was sought two days prior to the expiration of the prompt trial period,
a speedy trial claim would have been premature.
Determination of "valid and reasonable" grounds for a nolle prosequi, however, is more
difficult. Formerly, court approval of a request to enter a nolle prosequi was readily granted
unless the court was convinced that the prosecutor "was acting from improper motives, and
with a desire to wrong the defendant." Commonwealth v. Evans, 26 Pa. County Ct. 90 (C.P.
Colum. 1901). Later courts considered factors other than the prosecutor's motives. For
example, a prosecution could not be stayed if "the public interest involved in the nature of the
charge outweighs the personal preference of the prosecutor to discontinue .. "Common-
wealth v. McKeon, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 701 (C.P. Chester 1962). Furthermore, it was recognized
that the district attorney's power to request a nolle prosequi is subordinate to the court's
power to provide for the orderly administration of criminal justice and to protect an accused's
right to a fair trial and due process. Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 540-41, 246
A.2d 430, 432 (1968). A final prerequisite to the entry of a nolle prosequi is that the petition
contain signficant reasons that did not exist when the indictment was found. To hold
otherwise would be "to usurp the function and power of the grand jury." Commonwealth v.
Nossen, 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 559,564 (C.P. Colum. 1972). Thus, a valid reason for seeking a nolle
prosequi would be the unexpected refusal of the chief prosecution witness to testify. This is
precisely the situation in Whitaker. See note 9 supra.
over the nolle prosequi, however, is that it avoids indefinite postpone-
ment3" by requiring that the court order granting it must "specify the date
or period within which trial shall be commenced."
The lower courts have construed rule 1 100(c) to require not only the
prosecutor, but also the trial court and court administrator, to show due
diligence in bringing the defendant to trial within the required period.35
Thus, delays resulting from overcrowded dockets, 36 errors by the court
administrator's computer, 37 or late receipt of transcripts from preliminary
hearings 38 were considered insufficient grounds for granting a time exten-
sion. It was reasoned that prejudice to the defendant's speedy trial rights is
not lessened simply because the delay is occasioned by the courts.
39
Moreover, the prosecutorial delay condemned in Whitaker would continue
unimpeded if the district attorney could obtain a time extension by the mere
expedient of filing a form petition alleging court congestion.
40
This construction of rule 1100 resulted in a protest by the Pennsyl-
vania District Attorneys Association, which urged that hundreds of crimi-
nal defendants would be released without trial. 4' Thereafter, the supreme
court ruled in Commonwealth v. Mayfield42 that when the prosecutor has
certified well within the prompt trial period that he is ready for trial, but
seeks a time extension because of court congestion, the court may grant
that extension, contingent upon trial being rescheduled "for the earliest
possible date consistent with the court's business . . . . ''43 A corollary
requirement, however, is that the Commonwealth and the judiciary mani-
fest "the highest standards of professional responsibility" 4 in bringing the
defendant to trial.
The Mayfield holding is premised on the theory that "[t]he calendar-
ing of cases lies ultimately within the power and responsibility of the trial
court."-45 This theory is meaningless, however, unless the court actually
34. Commonwealth v. Whitaker, -Pa.-,-359 A.2d 174, 177(1976); Commonwealth
v. Coleman, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 361 A.2d 870, 873 n. I (1976) (continuance must be to
specific date even when granted upon request of defendant).
35. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 362 A.2d 994, rev'd, - Pa.-, 364
A.2d 1345 (1976); Commonwealth v. Millhouse, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 362 A.2d 398 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 873 (dictum), aff'd-Pa. -, 364
A.2d 694 (1976) (dictum disputed); Commonwealth v. Smith, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d
862 (1976); Commonwealth v. Reddington, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 760 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Sprankle, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 385 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Ray, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 360 A.2d 925 (1976); Commonwealth v. Silver, 238 Pa. Super. Ct.
221, 357 A.2d 612 (1976).
36. Id.
37. Commonwealth v. Cutillo, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 339 A.2d 123 (1975) (district
attorney does not need computer to know when 270 days expire).
38. Commonwealth v. Brenner, 101 Montg. 185 (Pa. C.P. 1976); Commonwealth v.
Freier, 101 Montg. 17 (Pa. C.P. 1976); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 100 Montg. 430 (Pa. C.P.
1976).
39. Commonwealth v. Silver, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 221, 357 A.2d 612 (1976).
40. Commonwealth v. Ray, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 360 A.2d 925, 927 (1976).
41. For reports on these protests see The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 23, 1976, § B, at 2,
col. I; id., May 10, 1976, § B, at I, col. I.
42. - Pa.-, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976).
43. Id. at -, 364 A.2d at 1349.
44. Id.
45. Id. at-, 364 A.2d at 1347. See also Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 246
A.2d 430 (1968).
accepts this responsibility and exercises its power. In Whitaker, for
example, the prosecutor was able to juggle the defendant's trial from day to
day and courtroom to courtroom.4 6 The Whitaker situation is not uncom-
mon. Prosecutors with "priority programs" have been known to schedule
the easier cases, rather than the oldest cases, first.47 Thus, while in theory
the trial court may manage trial calendars, in practice they are subject to
manipulation by the district attorney. This situation presents the possibility
that engineered "judicial" delay will suffice for a continuance. The door to
prosecutorial calendar juggling that was shut in Whitakerhas thus been set
ajar by Mayfield.
Nevertheless, the Whitaker rule can be extended to the prompt trial
problem encountered when a second complaint is filed against a defendant
alleging the same offense as in a previously dismissed complaint. Although
no definite rule has emerged,48 it has been found that when a private
prosecutor's complaint has been properly dismissed without objection, the
prompt trial period does not attach until a second complaint has been
filed.49 More consistent with Whitaker's reasoning, however, would be a
rule providing that the prompt trial period attaches when the defendant is
held to answer for the crime. 50 Such a rule would protect the defendant's
speedy trial right while discouraging evasive tactics by the Common-
wealth. It would also be flexible enough to prohibit attachment on a
complaint dismissed for lack of probable cause.
51
Although the impact of Whitakerhas been weakened by Mayfield, the
court's warning against Commonwealth use of dilatory tactics and its
policy of going beyond the "minimum standards" 52 imposed by Barker v.
Wingo53 reflect a pragmatic attitude toward regulating prosecutorial dis-
cretion and away from accumulating administrative costs as cases collect
dust. Moreover, the decision leaves unfettered the use of the nolle prosequi
46. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
47. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 327 A.2d 15 (1974). In Williams
the court "had the ultimate power and duty to control its calendar," yet the district attorney
scheduled the cases: "We just wanted to take the easier cases, so we just simply put the
homicides aside and we didn't even discuss them ...... Id. at 509, 327 A.2d at 18.
48. Since adoption of rule I100, only three cases have dealt with the question:
Commonwealth v. Mumich, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 359 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Passerin, 28 Bucks 340 (Pa. C.P. 1976); Commonwealth v. Bush, 27 Bucks 54 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
All were decided before Whitaker.
49. In Commonwealth v. Mumich, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 359 (1976), Judge
Jacobs concluded that the criminal complaint was substantially defective because the
affiant's signature was not on the defendant's copy of the complaint. The complaint,
therefore, was properly dismissed. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 361 A.2d at 360. Relying on this
decision, the court in Commonwealth v. Passerin, 28 Bucks 340 (Pa. C.P. 1976), observed that
the complaint was improperly dismissed because the magistrate should have transferred
venue rather than dismiss the case outright. Id. at 343.
50. ABA, SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 25, § 2.2(a), at 16. Justification for this approach is
its insurance "against long periods of detention, conditional release, personal anxiety, and
public suspicion." Id., comment at 20.
51. The prompt trial period should not commence when a prosecutor has caused the
release of a defendant on his own motion because he believed there was insufficient evidence
to have arrested the defendant in the first place. Id. at 19-21 & example 4.
52. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 302, 297 A.2d 127, 129 (1972).
53. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
in historically proper situations. 54 The troubling aspect of Whitaker,
however, is that it fails to recognize that by dismissing charges with
prejudice (the only solution possible under rule 1100), 55 the court may be
aiding the prosecution in denying the defendant his only means of public
exoneration. 56 Presumption of innocence notwithstanding, the defendant
may be subjected to the same public scorn when his case is dismissed for
failure to prosecute within the allotted trial period as when it is nolle
prossed for unwillingness to prosecute. Thus, the defendant should be
given the option to seek a final disposition of his case at trial even though
the prompt trial period has expired.57 Although such a choice raises the
specter of further court backlogs, it must not be forgotten that "it is justice
we are after. It is especially important that we always remember that slow
justice is always preferable to speedy injustice."
58
54. A. nolle prosequi is still useful in halting prosecution for a minor offense when the
aggrieved party has claimed satisfaction, see PA. R. CRIM. P. 315, or when the mental infirmity
of the accused nullifies any desire by society to prosecute, see Sun, The Discretionary Power
to Stay Criminal Proceedings, I DALHOUSIE L.J. 482, 488 (1974); Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
1057, 1071 (1955).
55. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(f) provides in part: "Any order granting such application [to
dismiss for violation of the rule] shall dismiss the charges with prejudice and discharge the
defendant."
56. In Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held
that entry of a nolle prosequi did not moot its remand to the Florida Supreme Court.
Otherwise, the defendant would be deprived of public exoneration. See also Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (recognizing the anxiety and scorn that lingers with public
accusation).
57. The unindicted but incarcerated defendant has the option to demand final disposi-
tion of a pending indictment. Act of June 28, 1957, P. L. 428, No. 234, § I, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 881 (1964). By slight amendment of PA. R. CRIM. P. I 100(f), any defendant could be given
the option to demand final disposition following expiration of the prompt trial period, either
by absolute discharge or by trial. A suggested revision of the rule reads as follows:
At any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney may apply to the court
for an order to either dismiss the charges with prejudice or mandate the Common-
wealth to bring the defendant to trial within thirty (30) days on the ground that this
Rule has been violated. A copy of such application shall be served upon the
attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon.
Any order granting either application shall discharge the defendant.
58. Comisky, Slow Justice is Preferable to Speedy Injustice, 44 PA. B. ASS'N. Q. 23
(1972).
[Casenote by Bernard V. O'Hare]
